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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant/Appellant Glendon Corporation (hereinafter "Glendon"), pursuant to Rule 
35, Utah R. App. P., petitions the court for rehearing of the decision filed September 27, 
1994 in the above-referenced matter on the grounds that a majority of the court overlooked 
or misapprehended the following points of law or fact: 
1. The fundamental issue in this case was: How much money, if any, did Glendon 
owe Bob Allen and Garth Leavitt (hereinafter "Allen & Leavitt") under the terms of the 
parties' subcontract? There was insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support the trial 
court's finding that Glendon owed Allen & Leavitt the sum of $7,215.00. 
2. Even if the parties' subcontract was ambiguous regarding backfill, the trial court 
failed to apply the unambiguous set-off (or recoupment) and damages provisions in the 
subcontract to reduce the amount Glendon owed Allen & Leavitt. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, TO SUPPORT THE AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT 
There is no dispute that the parties entered into the written subcontract identified as 
plaintiffs exhibit, hereinafter "PEx." 2 and attached as addendum "B" to Appellant's principal 
brief ("APB"). (Defendant's exhibit, hereinafter "DEx." 1, Transcript on appeal, hereinafter 
"Tr." 30-31, 55). The parties' subcontract incorporated the project Plans and Specifications. 
(PEx. 2) 
The trial court concluded there was an ambiguity in the subcontract as to whether 
Allen & Leavitt were obligated to provide backfill material. (APB addendum G) Apparently 
a majority of this court agreed. Appellant contends, however, that the plans and 
specifications (as incorporated into the subcontract) unambiguously required Allen & Leavitt 
to do excavation work, including "all labor necessary to produce the construction required 
by the Contract Documents and all materials and equipment incorporated or to be 
incorporated in such construction". (DEx. 4) Appellant urges the court to carefully 
reconsider whether the subcontract was ambiguous. 
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the subcontract was ambiguous, and 
that, despite no finding by the trial court, the parties intended for Glendon to supply the 
backfill, the evidence at trial was still insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the amount 
of judgment. Allen & Leavitt's complaint alleged breach of contract and claimed damages 
of $7,715.00. At trial, the only evidence offered to support this damages claim was a billing 
statement, a copy of which is attached hereto as addendum 1. (See also APB addendum C, 
PEx. 1) 
Glendon requested the billing statement to support in writing Allen & Leavitt's draw 
request. The billing statement was based on hours worked multiplied by an hourly rate for 
the type of machinery used. (Tr. 36, 122, PEx. 1). On cross-examination, Allen & Leavitt 
admitted their subcontract with Glendon was for a fixed sum. They also acknowledged that 
the billing statement should have been calculated based on percentage of job completed. (Tr. 
36-37, 54). Paragraph 21 of the parties' subcontract contemplated payment based on 
2 
percentage of job completed. No evidence at trial supported a damage award based on 
hours worked. Yet, the trial court premised its award on Allen & Leavitt's billing statement. 
This court should not affirm a damage award calculated from a formula that has no 
relationship to the parties' agreement and the facts of this case. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY UNAMBIGUOUS 
SETOFF AND DAMAGES PROVISIONS IN THE SUBCONTRACT 
Allen & Leavitt demanded payment of $6,000.00 from Glendon. (Tr. 53). Lefler 
questioned the amount and asked them to support it in writing. (Tr. 54). Allen said he 
submitted PEx. 1 (Addendum 1 hereto) "right after that". When Glendon did not 
immediately pay the draw, Allen & Leavitt walked off the job. (Tr. 29, 103). 
Allen & Leavitt did not have a contractual right to immediate payment of the draw. 
Due to time constraints, this point was not raised at oral argument, however, it justifies 
appellant's exercise of its setoff rights under the terms of the parties' subcontract. 
Glendon's policy was to pay a draw submitted by the 25th of the month on the 25th 
of the following month. (TR. 118-119). This policy is reflected on the obverse of the parties' 
subcontract under the headings "Terms". Paragraph 21 of the subcontract required Allen & 
Leavitt to wait for payment until Glendon received payment from the owner, Farmington 
City. On this project, Farmington City actually prepared separate checks payable to 
individual subcontractors and delivered them to Glendon for disbursement. (Tr. 86, 118). 
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When Allen & Leavitt walked off the job they breached the parties' subcontract, 
which in turn gave Glendon the following contractual remedies: 
No. 9. SETOFF: All claims for money due or to become due from Buyer shall be 
subject to deduction or setoff by the Buyer by reason of any counterclaim arising out 
of this or any other transaction with Seller. 
No. 12. TERMINATION FOR CAUSE: Buyer may also terminate this order or any 
part thereof for cause in the event of any default by the Seller, or if the Seller fails 
to comply with any of the terms and conditions of this offer. Late deliveries, 
deliveries of products which are defective or which do not conform to this order, or 
failure to provide Buyer reasonable assurances of future performance, on request, 
shall each be a cause allowing Buyer to terminate this order for cause. In the event 
of termination for cause, Buyer shall not be liable to Seller for any amount, and Seller 
shall be liable to Buyer for any and all damages sustained by reason of the default 
which gave rise to the termination. . . . 
No. 28. To commence and at all times to carry on, perform and complete this 
subcontract to the full and complete satisfaction of the contractor, and of the architect 
or owner. It is specifically understood and agreed that in the event the contractor 
shall at any time be of the opinion that the subcontractor is not proceeding with 
diligence and in such a manner as to satisfactorily complete said work within the 
required time, then and in that event the contractor shall have the right, after 
reasonable notice, to take over said work and to complete the same at the cost and 
expense of the subcontractor, without prejudice to the contractor's other rights or 
remedies for any loss or damage sustained. 
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that Glendon was obligated to supply 
backfill, Glendon still incurred damages from Allen & Leavitt's breach which were subject 
to setoff (recoupment) under the subcontract. There was uncontroverted testimony at trial 
that Glendon employees Steve Lefler and Ted Cromer spent 69 hours at $30.00 per hour 
for a total of $2,070.00 soliciting a replacement for Allen & Leavitt. Also, the trial judge 
said "the vast majority" of the $6,800.00 Glendon paid Farmington City was for transport of 
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backfill. (Tr. 136-37). He did not say all $6,800.00 was for backfill. Any amount of the 
$6,800.00 attributable to Allen & Leavitt's breach would be subject to setoff (recoupment). 
The trial court deducted $500.00 from Allen & Leavitt's request for damages based 
on a change order that created less excavation work than originally bid. The court failed, 
however, to setoff Glendon's damages arising from Allen & Leavitt's breach. 
Where questions arise in the interpretation of an agreement, the first source 
of inquiry is within the document itself. It should be looked at in its entirety 
and in accordance with its purpose. All of its parts should be given effect 
insofar as that is possible, (emphasis added) 
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert 784 P.2d 1210,1213, (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah App. 1987)); 
See, Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
Glendon relied on the terms in the subcontract for legal support and protection in its 
dealings with Allen & Leavitt. By ignoring Glendon's contractual right to setoff 
(recoupment) while using an alleged ambiguity to interpret the subcontract against Glendon's 
interests, the trial court has exhibited extreme prejudice and a cavalier disregard for basic 
contract law. Such judicial favoritism undermines the integrity of contracts and the 
confidence of contracting parties. 
. . . [A] court may not make a better contract for the parties 
than they have made for themselves; furthermore, a court may 
not enforce asserted rights not supported by the contract itself.. 
. . 'It cannot be adopted as a general precept of contract law 
that, whenever one party to a contract can show injury flowing 
from the exercise of a contract right by the other, a basis for 
relief will be somehow devised by the courts.' 
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Ted R. Brown & Assoc, v. Games Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970-71 (Utah App. 1988) (citations 
omitted). The unambiguous provisions in the subcontract should be applied to reduce the 
amount of judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Glendon respectfully requests that the court grant 
its petition for rehearing. Counsel for Glendon certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
DATED this day of October, 1994. 
Ronald E. Griffin 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFTCATP. OF MATT TNG 
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of October, 1994,1 caused to be mailed two true and 
correct copies of the attached and foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING BY GLENDON 
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